Теория экономических механизмов

: Литература по курсу
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Опубликован: 05.08.2011 | Доступ: свободный | Студентов: 1544 / 82 | Оценка: 4.50 / 3.50 | Длительность: 18:52:00
ISBN: 978-5-9963-0014-3
Темы: Математика, Экономика
Специальности: Математик, Экономист
Теги: 'padding', AGV, beta, агенты, анализ, аукцион викри, дизайн, доминантная стратегия, доходность, игры, интеграл, оптимальная стратегия, процессоры, разработка, случайная величина, статистика, теория, теория игр, торговля, центили, эффективность
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